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1 Introduction
Prior to trade, a seller can often disclose information that is relevant for the buyer's
valuation, and the buyer himself can acquire information on his own. A seller of a
new product, for instance, could provide a video demonstration, and potential buyers
could inspect customer reviews. This paper shows that sellers might prefer buyers
to acquire information, rather than disclosing suﬃcient information themselves.
Pre-trade information can have a social and a private value: On the one hand, it
may allow to examine whether the buyer's valuation is larger than the seller's, and
thus whether trade would be eﬃcient. On the other hand, it may allow the buyer to
check whether his valuation is larger than the price, and thus whether trade would
be proﬁtable for himself. This latter aspect potentially forces the seller to command
a low price, and is the relevant aspect in my analysis.
If information acquisition entails low costs and the buyer is to dispense with
it, the private value of information must be low as well. In contrast, if the seller
tailors her oﬀer so as to induce information acquisition, the private value of any
further information need not be low, provided that the buyer cannot acquire further
information at equally low costs. For this reason, the seller may prefer the buyer to
acquire informationeven if she could easily disclose suﬃcient information herself.
The result suggests that regulation requiring comprehensive information disclosure
may promote welfare, because such regulation potentially prevents costlier informa-
tion acquisition on the side of the consumers.
A recent literature studies information disclosure by a mechanism designer (e.g.,
Bergemann and Pesendorfer 2007; Lewis and Sappington 1994; Li and Shi 2015).
A diﬀerent literature studies information acquisition by agents (e.g., Crémer and
Khalil 1992; Crémer et al. 1998; Shi 2012). To the best of my knowledge, the
two issues have not been studied in combination before. The seminal paper on
information disclosure by Milgrom (1981) diﬀers in that, in my model, the seller
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does not know how the information aﬀects the buyer's valuation. This assumption
reﬂects the buyer having privately known tastes, needs, etc., and follows the recent
mechanism-design literature on disclosure.
2 Model
A buyer and a seller can exchange one unit of a good. The seller's valuation is zero.
The buyer's valuation is v. If the good is traded at price p, the seller's payoﬀ is p
and the buyer's payoﬀ v − p.
The seller proposes the price as a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. At that date, both
parties do not know the buyer's valuation. Both believe that v equals vH with
probability µ and vL with probability 1 − µ, where µ ∈ (0, 1), vH > vL > 0, and
µvH > vL. Let v˜ be the corresponding random variable.
When the seller proposes the price, she can disclose arbitrary information about
the valuation to the buyer. Speciﬁcally, she can choose a signal s˜ of v˜ and let
the buyer inspect it. A signal is characterized by a signal-realization space and
conditional distributions over signal realizations given the valuation. The buyer
observes both the chosen signal and its realization. A perfect signal, for example,
has conditional distributions whose supports are disjoint across vL and vH , so that
the buyer fully learns his valuation. A null signal, in contrast, has conditional
distributions that are identical across vL and vH , so that the buyer learns nothing.
After the seller proposes the price and discloses information, before deciding
whether or not to buy, the buyer can acquire information on his own. This in-
formation is represented by a particular signal of v˜, denoted by s˜′. The possible
realizations of s˜′ are s′H and s
′
L. Conditional on the valuation being high, s˜
′ is cor-
rect with probability one, Pr[s′H |vH ] = 1. Conditional on the valuation being low, s˜′
may be wrong, Pr[s′H |vL] = γ ∈ (0, 1). Note that upon observing signal realization
s′L, the buyer thus knows for sure that his valuation is low.
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Information acquisition entails a cost of c > 0 for the buyer. Information disclo-
sure, in contrast, entails zero costs for both parties. The seller can choose any signal
s˜, with the only restriction that conditional on the valuation, s˜ is independent of s˜′.
Her objective is to choose the signal and propose the price such that her expected
payoﬀ is maximized.
3 Analysis
3.1 Preliminaries
Gross of potential information acquisition expenses, the social surplus is v if trade
takes place and zero otherwise. Hence, trade is always eﬃcient, regardless of the
buyer's valuation. Any information about the valuation is thus socially worthless.
In the ﬁrst-best, the good is consequently traded with certainty, and the buyer does
not waste resources for information acquisition. Whether or not the seller discloses
information is then irrelevant with respect to surplus, given that disclosure entails
no costs.
Suppose information acquisition was impossible. In that case, the seller could
obtain the ﬁrst-best surplus, namely, by charging the price p = E[v˜] = vL+µ(vH−vL)
and disclosing no information (i.e., choosing a null signal). In the original model, the
seller can not obtain the ﬁrst-best surplus, unless the information-acquisition cost is
prohibitively high. To be precise, suppose the seller charges p = E[v˜] and chooses a
null signal. If, instead of buying immediately, the buyer ﬁrst acquires information,
he will with probability (1−µ)(1−γ) observe s′L and thus learn that his valuation is
low. He could then avoid a loss of µ(vH − vL) by declining the seller's oﬀer. Taking
the information-acquisition cost into account, this procedure is strictly better than
buying immediately if and only if
µ(1− µ)(1− γ)(vH − vL) > c. (1)
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I assume from now on that (1) holds. Hence, the seller cannot obtain the ﬁrst-
best surplus.
3.2 Deterring information acquisition
My ﬁrst step is to derive the seller's best price-disclosure strategy that deters infor-
mation acquisition. In the next section, I show that this strategy may be suboptimal,
that is, the seller may be able to obtain a larger expected payoﬀ with a strategy
that induces information acquisition.
Given that information acquisition is to be deterred, I can without loss of gen-
erality assume that the seller chooses a signal whose possible realizations are B and
¬B, such that upon observing B the buyer buys without information acquisition and
upon ¬B he declines without information acquisition. I may furthermore assume
that ¬B is displayed with probability zero if the valuation is high, Pr[¬B|vH ] = 0.
To see the latter, note that shifting probability mass from ¬B to B conditional on
vH increases the buyer's posterior expected valuation upon B and decreases it upon
¬B, so that he is still willing to buy and decline, respectively.
The seller's choice variables are thus the price and the conditional distributions
over the signal realizations B and ¬B. Rather than considering the conditional
distributions, I will focus on the distribution over the buyer's posterior beliefs. It is
well-known that this approach entails no loss of generality (see, e.g., Kamenica and
Gentzkow 2011). Speciﬁcally, let x := Pr[vH |B] be the buyer's posterior belief that
his valuation is high upon observing signal realization B. (Note that Pr[vH |¬B] is
already ﬁxed to zero, given Pr[¬B|vH ] = 0.) Let β := Pr[B] be the unconditional
probability with which this signal realization is displayed. Then, every combination
(x, β) with x, β ∈ [0, 1] such that the expected posterior equals the prior,
βx = µ, (2)
corresponds to a pair of conditional distributions Pr[·|vH ],Pr[·|vL] over the signal
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realizations, and vice versa.
By (2), β is ﬁxed to µ/x. A feasible price-disclosure strategy is thus a combina-
tion (p, x) with
x ∈ [µ, 1] (3)
that satisﬁes the following incentive conditions: First, upon observing B the buyer
must buy without information acquisition. Hence, this must be better than declining
without information acquisition,
vL + x(vH − vL)− p ≥ 0, (4)
and than acquiring information and then buying if and only if the buyer-signal, s˜′,
displays s′H :
vL + x(vH − vL)− p ≥ Pr[s′H |B] [vL + Pr[vH |s′H , B](vH − vL)− p]− c
⇔ vL + x(vH − vL)− p ≥ [x+ γ(1− x)]
[
vL +
x
x+ γ(1− x)(vH − vL)− p
]
− c
⇔ (1− γ)(1− x)(vL − p) + c ≥ 0. (5)
Second, the buyer must decline without information acquisition upon observing ¬B.
This condition will be satisﬁed automatically, and can thus be ignored.
Consider now the seller's objective. Her expected payoﬀ from a price-disclosure
strategy (p, x) that satisﬁes (3)(5) is (µ/x)p. Hence, the best strategy is the solution
to
max
p,x
µ
x
p s.t. (3)(5). (6)
The following lemma characterizes the best strategy for low information-acquisition
cost levels, and states the seller's corresponding expected payoﬀ.
Lemma 1. There exists a cutoﬀ level of the information-acquisition cost c∗ > 0
such that for all c < c∗, the best price-disclosure strategy that deters information
6
acquisition is given by
p∗ := vL + x∗(vH − vL) and x∗ := 1
2
+
√
1
4
− c
(1− γ)(vH − vL) .
The seller's corresponding expected payoﬀ, as a function of the information-acquisition
cost, is
Π∗(c) :=
µ
1
2
+
√
1
4
− c
(1−γ)(vH−vL)
vL + µ(vH − vL).
Proof. I ﬁrst show that (5), the no-information-acquisition constraint, holds with
equality at the optimum. Suppose not. Then, the seller would choose p such that
(4), the individual-rationality condition, holds with equality. This implies that the
optimal x would be strictly larger than µ, for otherwise (5) was violated by condition
(1). But then slightly reducing x and p such that (4) still holds with equality would
raise the seller's expected payoﬀ and satisfy all constraints.
Since (5) holds with equality and c > 0, the optimal x satisﬁes x < 1 and the
optimal price satisﬁes
p = vL +
c
(1− γ)(1− x) .
Moreover, problem (6) can be reformulated as
max
x∈[µ,1)
µ
x
[
vL +
c
(1− γ)(1− x)
]
s.t. x(vH − vL)− c
(1− γ)(1− x) ≥ 0. (7)
The objective function in problem (7) is strictly convex on [µ, 1). Hence, the
optimal x is either the lowest possible value, µ, or the highest possible value, the
root x∗ of the constraint in (7). With x = x∗, the optimal price is p∗ and the value
of the objective function Π∗(c). With x = µ, in contrast, the value of the objective
function is
Π(c) := vL +
c
(1− γ)(1− µ) .
Now,
lim
c↘0
Π∗(c) = µvH > lim
c↘0
Π(c) = vL,
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where the inequality holds by assumption. By continuity, the inequality holds for a
whole interval of information-acquisition cost levels, concluding the proof.
Under the price-disclosure strategy in the lemma, the buyer is indiﬀerent whether
to acquire information. That is, the value of information to him is exactly equal
to the information-acquisition cost, c. The value of information to the buyer is
(1 − γ)(1 − x)(vL − p), (1 − γ)(1 − x) being the probability with which he would
observe s′L and thus learn that his valuation is low, and (vL − p) being the possible
loss that he could then avoid by declining the oﬀer.
Now, with the price p∗ the seller gets the entire expected surplus conditional on
trade taking place. In particular, p∗ > vL, so that the buyer indeed makes a loss if
he buys with the low valuation. For low c, the buyer must therefore be relatively
certain to have the high valuation, given that he is to dispense with information
acquisition. Indeed, in the limit, when c ↘ 0, the seller must fully remove all
uncertainty (i.e., choose x = 1, respectively, a perfect signal). In that case, trade
takes place only if the buyer has the high valuation.
3.3 Deterring information acquisition may be suboptimal
The main result is that deterring information acquisition may be suboptimal:
Proposition 1. There exists a cutoﬀ level of the information-acquisition cost cˆ > 0
such that for all c < cˆ there exists a price-disclosure strategy that induces information
acquisition and yields the seller an expected payoﬀ strictly larger than Π∗(c).
Proof. Consider the following strategy. The seller discloses no information (i.e.,
chooses a null signal), and proposes the price
pˆ := vL +
µ
µ+ (1− µ)γ (vH − vL)−
c
µ+ (1− µ)γ .
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If the buyer then acquires information (and buys if and only if the buyer-signal
displays s′H), his expected payoﬀ is
Pr[s′H ][vL + Pr[vH |s′H ](vH − vL)− pˆ]− c
= [µ+ (1− µ)γ](vL − pˆ) + µ(vH − vL)− c
= 0.
In contrast, if he buys immediately, without acquiring information, his expected
payoﬀ is
vL + µ(vH − vL)− pˆ
= − 1
µ+ (1− µ)γ [µ(1− µ)(1− γ)(vH − vL)− c]
< 0,
where the inequality holds by condition (1). Thus, the buyer strictly prefers ac-
quiring information over buying immediately, and is indiﬀerent between acquiring
information and declining immediately. So suppose he acquires information. The
seller's expected payoﬀ, as a function of the information-acquisition cost, is then
Πˆ(c) := Pr[s′H ]pˆ = (1− µ)γvL + µvH − c.
Now,
lim
c↘0
Πˆ(c) = (1− µ)γvL + µvH > lim
c↘0
Π∗(c) = µvH .
By continuity, the inequality holds for a whole interval of information-acquisition
cost levels, concluding the proof.
Deterring information acquisition is very expensive if the information-acquisition
cost is low: the value of information to the buyer must be almost zero. According to
Lemma 1, the seller will then inform the buyer almost perfectly, and thus sell almost
only if the valuation is high. In contrast, if the buyer acquires information the seller
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can extract the entire expected surplus and yet sell with a certain probability also
if the valuation is loweven though the buyer will then make a loss. In particular,
upon information acquisition, the value of any further information does not have to
be zero, since there is no further information to acquire.
Remark 1. If the buyer-signal may be wrong also conditional on the valuation being
high, Pr[s′H |vH ] < 1, the buyer might decline upon information acquisition even if
his valuation is high, which makes inducing information acquisition less attractive.
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